THE CHURCH OF ORIGINALISM
*

S. L. Whitesell

“On every question of construction, [we] carry ourselves back to the time
when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text,
or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was
passed . . . . Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding, and should,
therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their
meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which may make
anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure.”
Thomas Jefferson
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INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson wrote these words in 1823, long after the end of
his public career and two years before his death. One hundred and
fifty years later, a movement emerged that sought to recapture the
spirit of Jefferson’s advice. Perceiving that judges were using metaphysical subtleties to remake the Constitution in their own image, the
originalist movement called for a return to the framing generation’s
understandings of constitutional text. The call did not go unanswered: scholars and judges leveled powerful criticisms against
originalism that its scholarly adherents could not ignore. Since the
first pitched battles in the 1970s and 1980s, this battle for the Constitution’s meaning has raged on. Originalism has matured from nascent antagonist to perhaps the dominant force in interpretive theory.
*
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J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I owe special thanks to Professor Sophia Lee for her prudence in narrowing my ambitions and her wise and extensive feedback on earlier drafts. I also thank Ryan Williams, Sharswood Fellow in Originalism at the University of Pennsylvania, for his generous and patient advice. As is his wont,
David Bernstein swiftly and genially corrected my misconceptions about Lochner. And
Professor William Ewald’s tutelage was indispensable in framing a more nuanced understanding of the founding error.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 439, 449–50 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., Mem’l ed. 1904). This maxim is part of a disquisition on jurisprudence in
which Jefferson directly criticized Chief Justice John Marshall for his “very irregular and
very censurable” behavior on the bench. Id. at 447.
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Although originalism appears to be ascendant on the legal battlefield today, misconceptions abound regarding the theory’s (or theories’) content and the movement’s history. On the standard telling,
the “Old Originalism” was concerned primarily with original intent,
asking what the actual enactors actually thought. This theory became
encumbered by criticism and theoretical difficulties, like so many epicycles on a Ptolemaic system. Originalists responded by rejecting intent in favor of objective public meaning—that is, how the contemporaneous public would have understood the text. So it was that the
“New Originalists,” adherents to original public meaning originalism,
displaced their outmoded ancestors. The sense is that the transition
from intent to meaning was a sharp and total break from what had
come before—a paradigm shift, to borrow from the epistemologists.
The common story overstates the trend from intentions to meaning, leaving the impression that originalism is gradually working toward a pure, platonic theory of constitutional meaning. This Comment proposes a different way of understanding originalism’s history.
Old Originalism did not encounter a Ptolemaic crisis, eventually
2
dropping its epicycles in a fit of Kuhnian revolution. Science is the
wrong analogy: we should look instead to other belief communities.
As originalism matured and gained a wider following, adherents
adopted different modalities that eventually sorted originalists into
different camps. The better model is to think of originalism like an
3
early church which, when difficult questions arise, divides into sects.
Rather than a paradigm shift, it may be more apt to speak of a
schism. Like all analogies, this comparison to religion will fail at
some level. The Constitution is not Holy Writ, so disagreement cannot become heresy; there is no magisterial edifice in legal theory, so
those sects cannot be banished like recalcitrant Pelagians. For various reasons (not least because less is at stake than with sacred doc-
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See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
For a Kuhnian perspective on republicanism in legal scholarship, see Daniel T. Rodgers,
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992).
Others have invoked a similar motif. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism,
in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 223,
244 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (comparing the “plight” of Old
Originalism to “that of the old-time religious believers”); Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful
Originalist?: Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 873, 879 (2011) (using biblical language to refer to Justice Scalia’s and Justice
Thomas’s relationships to originalism).
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trine), the various camps of modern originalism are considerably
4
more amicable than, say, the Anabaptists and the Zwinglians.
Part I recounts the history of originalism in order to provide the
context of the intentions/meaning distinction. In telling this story,
this Comment is sensitive to parts of the narrative that are often marginalized, causing some of the misapprehension. Examining the narrative at a higher resolution allows lessons to be drawn from the Old
about the New. Part II then takes a closer look at originalism as a
family of theories, seeking an accurate account of how elements in
the Old map on to the New. Identifying the chronological shift from
Old to New is a helpful first step, but it is not a complete explanation.
The central proposal of this Comment is that New Originalism contains a division between “High Originalism” and “Low Originalism,”
based roughly on how great a role the actual human enactors play in
originalist interpretation. This division was latent in the Old
Originalism and, indeed, lurks beneath Jefferson’s words. This
should make it clear that High and Low are not substitutes for Old
and New.
I. THE STORY OF ORIGINALISM
In some quarters originalism brings with it preconceptions that
may interfere with properly understanding it (let alone arguing its
merits). It is possible to offer a reply brief, as it were, to these liminal
objections and attempt to satisfy the reader that he should proceed to
the merits. This Comment may accomplish some of that in what follows. But it is considerably easier and perhaps less contentious to
begin with a narrative of originalism’s emergence. A quick sketch
explains why originalism was largely reactive and untheorized when it
emerged around the bicentennial of independence. This Part briefly
describes the context out of which originalism emerged before reconstructing its history in greater detail.
A preliminary distinction is the one between the use of history and
the search for original understanding on the one hand, and originalism as an “ism” on the other. It would be reasonable to define
originalism as an a posteriori designation of interpretive methods that
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When the Anabaptists repeatedly refused to acquiesce to infant baptism, the city council
of Zurich finally issued an ironic edict: “He who dips, shall be dipped.” The leading Anabaptist Reformers were bound and cast into the river Limmat. 8 PHILIP SCHAFF, HISTORY
OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 55 (3d ed. rev. The Electronic Bible Society 1998) (1892).
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meet certain criteria, for instance a focus on text and history, but this
Comment will reserve the term for the organized expressions of theo6
ry and practice that began to emerge in the 1970s. Using the label in
7
this way recognizes a lexical fact (the term itself dates to the 1980s )
and respects the historical implications of that fact. The term is also
not applied loosely to any interpretive theory that has regard for orig8
inal meaning. Using it this way dilutes it beyond usefulness. What
follows, then, describes originalism in the United States.
A. Before Originalism
Whatever else their differences, English political theorists at the
time of the American Revolution were united behind the principle
that Parliament is sovereign: indeed, “[i]t can, in short, do every9
thing that is not naturally impossible.” As the pamphlet wars leading
up to Lexington demonstrate, the War of Independence was fought

5
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9

O’Neill uses the term “textual originalism” to describe pre-New Deal interpretive methods. A feature of these methods is that they uncritically conflated what is now called textualism and originalism. JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 12–42 (2005).
This is in part to avoid conversational difficulty with those who may think that originalism
claims too much for itself. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1347 (1997) (recognizing somewhat critically that originalism
arose as a movement from conservative politics).
A Google NGram viewer inquiry is published as an appendix. Google Books Ngram
Viewer, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited May 13, 2014). See also Lawrence
B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory 2–5 (2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543 (recounting the history of the word
“originalism”).
E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1769–70 (1997) (labeling judicial use of history in
nonoriginalist contexts as “ancestral originalism” and “heroic originalism”). But see James
E. Fleming, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L. J. 1849, 1851, 1855 (1997)
(pointing out the confusion Dorf engenders by appropriating the term).
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129 (4th ed.) (London, John Murray 1876). Blackstone’s description of Parliament sounds rather like he is
describing a deity—“The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so
transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within
any bounds,” and
[i]t has sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming,
enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of
laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or
temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where
that absolute despotic power . . . is intrusted [sic] by the constitution of
these kingdoms.
Id. at 128. It chills the American blood.
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in large part over this very dispute. After the dust settled at Yorktown, the American political settlement rejected legislative sovereignty, adopting instead the apotheosis of social contract theory: popular
sovereignty. The real disagreement between English and American
conceptions concerns the locus of sovereignty. For the English, the
people once, in time immemorial, spoke Parliament into existence
and its rule on their behalf–and as their representatives—was then
eternal. For Americans, the consent of the governed is the font of
sovereignty and its continuing warrant. The “revolution principle”
holds not only that “the supreme or sovereign power of the society
resides in the citizens at large” but that “they always retain the right of
abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time,
11
and in whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient.” The people
spoke the Constitution into being, ordering their subservient government as they pleased. The government would not have the power
to alter its metes and bounds without their consent.
The Constitution, then, was an instrument of the people to control their government just as an act of Parliament controlled the subjects of the realm. Blackstone may have said that Parliament was “un12
controulable,” but he and the Americans shared a common view of
how such instruments should be construed. Here the Lion and the
Eagle converge: the intent of the lawgiver is paramount. Blackstone
organized his canons of construction around the central goal of giv13
ing effect to the legislative undertaking. Influenced by Blackstone
14
in its study of law and reacting to the abuses of a distant sovereign,
the founding generation of the United States adopted a positive law
15
constitution. Hamilton manifests this theme in the 78th Federalist;
this is important because the Federalist is the means by which Publius

10
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See C. Bradley Thompson, The Revolutionary Origins of American Constitutionalism, in
HISTORY ON PROPER PRINCIPLES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FORREST MCDONALD 1–18 (Stephen
M. Klugewicz & Lenore T. Ealy eds., 2010).
1 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 399, 440 (Kermit
L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
James Wilson, Opening Address at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
Thompson, supra note 10, at 15.
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2–3 (U.S. 1776) (expressing concern
about tyrannical governments, especially that of the King of Great Britain).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Whatever else the Constitution is, it is at
least that much. The claim here is not meant to provoke controversy over whether the
Constitution is also a common law charter or an invitation to moral reasoning.
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sought to allay fears of latent tyranny in the new Constitution. It is a
17
strong bridge between Blackstonian intentionalism and America’s
founding generation.
Early American practice corroborates that the mindset successfully
arrived in the new republic. The mode of argument is invoked in
18
debates in the early congresses, in the judicial reasoning of the early
19
20
Court, in scholarly treatises, and even in Reconstruction era de21
bates. As noted below, there is some question about what kind and
whose intent these early jurists sought, but there is no real dispute
that they sought to give the law the effect its words conveyed. But by
the end of the nineteenth century, during and around the oft22
criticized Lochner era, formalist logic and Progressive activism began
to place a great strain on the text. For several decades the judiciary
frustrated legislative efforts to regulate society on the basis of, for example, a “deduced” right of economic due process, leading even
freemarketeers to sympathize with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
protest that the Constitution “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
23
Social Statics.” Lochner and the jurisprudential debates surrounding
it thus fueled the contention that constitutional interpretation was
essentially a political task. Resonating with James Bradley Thayer’s
24
famous essay, the Lochner Court became an icon of the counter-

16
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19

20

21
22

23
24

Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 350,
351 (1988) (describing how the federalists sought to reassure the ratifiers by downplaying
both the power of the judges and the powers of the Presidency).
The word is enigmatic and there is disagreement about whether the colonial-era English
theorists sought authorial or objective intent. See infra Part I.B.
See O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 16–17 (discussing early congressional debates over constitutional meanings).
An examination of the reports of the first several decades of Supreme Court decisions—
especially the early seriatim opinions—will bear this out. E.g., Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 3-4 (Fed. Ct. App. 1781) (interpreting an "ordinance of Congress"
so as to avoid a "violence both to [its] terms and spirit, or intention"); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437 (1793) (Iredell, J.) (referring to "the clear intention of the
act"), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Glass v. The Sloop
Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 12 (1794) (seeking "the intention of the legislature").
E.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833); THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS (Da Capo Press 1972) (1868).
See O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 21–24 (discussing originalism in the Reconstruction era).
See generally David N. Mayer, Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and Fall of Liberty
of Contract, 60 MERCER L. REV. 563 (2009) (discussing the “misunderstood . . . forty-year
period known as the ‘Lochner Era’”).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 17 (1893).
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25

majoritarian difficulty. David Bernstein has chronicled the many
failings with this view of Lochner and its Court; the subject is quite
complex and his book is an important inoculation against breezy
condemnations. Still, the politicization of the Constitution reached
26
new heights in this crucible of “creedal passion.”
By the time President Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected, the traditional methods of interpretation “conflicted with modern intellectual
27
trends and directly confronted the New Deal” political forces. The
confluence of new ways of thinking across large swathes of human
thought is too large a subject even to summarize here, but it must suffice to say that the shift in jurisprudence was not an isolated phe28
nomenon. Against the arrayed forces of modernist thought and
immense political pressure, the old order laid down its arms and was
29
consigned to a supporting role over the next half century.
In the “good old days,” however, the Court was neither always
30
faithful to its purported goals nor especially rigorous in the execu31
tion of its task. Common law precedence over statutory enactments
was an idea with some pedigree, as it was raised by Sir Edward Coke

25

See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
ed. 1962).
See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY
85–90, 130–148 (1981) (describing the peculiarly American phenomenon of “creedal
passion periods”); cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1054–55 (justifying, among other things, the New Deal as a legitimate
“constitutional moment” during which the people move beyond ordinary politics).
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 28.
Woodrow Wilson had brought a modern view to politics much earlier: “[G]overnment is
not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under
the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton.” WOODROW
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908). An iconic
evisceration of modernism, tracing the degradation of culture since at least the Renaissance, can be found in RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES (1948). See also
C. S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1947) (observing the incoherence of relativism);
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
O’Neill notes that arguments from original intent and meaning continued to be persuasive even as they ceased to be authoritative. O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 37–39. See also Lorianne Updike Toler et al., Pre-”Originalism”, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 318–19
(2012) (noticing that the Warren and Burger courts invoked historical meaning at a
higher rate than others). But see Fleming, supra note 6, at 1347 (distinguishing between
the “uses of history” as employed and discussed in the 1960s and originalism, and suggesting that the former is the norm).
See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (tracing through history the impulse of
judges to reach outside the constitution to enact their own political preferences).
See Toler et al., supra note 29, at 303 (acknowledging the nineteenth century Court’s use
of history but pointing out its methodological inconsistencies).
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d

26

27
28

29

30

31
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32

in Dr. Bonham’s Case. And in America, the specter of judicial usurpation in the name of natural justice presented itself in the very first
decade in the famous scrap between Justices Samuel Chase and James
33
Iredell. Writing seriatim, Justice Chase volunteered his opinion that
“the nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of
34
it.” Justice Iredell dressed him down with the argument for judicial
35
review prominent in Marbury and Federalist 78. Whatever the historical merits of originalism’s claim to an older orthodoxy, the important fact is that originalists perceive themselves as operating with36
in this narrative.
Likewise, the new method of interpretation, while ascendant, was
37
not unopposed. Judicial decisions came with strong dissents.
Moreover, it is counterproductive (and not only by virtue of being
uncharitable) to ignore liberal criticisms of the Court in this era.
Standing in a long stream of process theory, these began almost im38
mediately and political liberals continued to struggle with the prob-

32

33

34
35
36

37

38

(1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P.). Coke’s assertion that “in many cases, the common law
will . . . controul Acts of Parliament” is the subject of controversy. Id. at 652. See generally
John V. Orth, Did Sir Edward Coke Mean What He Said?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 34
(1999) (questioning whether Coke was “merely mouthing dicta” in Dr. Bonham’s Case).
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 274–75 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing Justices Chase and Iredell’s points of view in Calder); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 30,
at 19–20 (discussing the constitutional disagreement between Justices Chase and Iredell
in Calder).
Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.
Id. at 398–99. (“The power, however, is judicial in its nature; and wherever it is exercised,
as in the present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative, authority.”).
Robert Bork certainly did, and it is uncontroversial to say that political conservatives in
the post-Reagan years regard Bork’s failed nomination as the climax of the first pitched
battle. Justice Scalia likewise rejects Professor Gordon Wood’s invocation of Dr. Bonham’s
Case and asserts that “[t]he genuine orthodoxy is set forth in Blackstone[.]” Antonin
Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129,
130 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Response].
E.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675–76 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the Due Process
Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the Constitution as
written so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which a majority of the Court
at any given time believes are needed to meet present-day problems.”); id. at 686 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (“[I]t is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines
popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare all others to be
irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice by reasonably minded
people acting through the political process.”).
See G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 280–82 (1973) (discussing the elements of Realism in
American jurisprudence, which it is argued emerged in the 1930s). Interestingly, the sustained attacks from the left began in earnest in 1937, a year usually regarded as the mo-
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39

lem of the Court as a “naked power organ.” It is worthwhile for today’s originalists to take note of these criticisms: the call for “neu40
41
tral” or at least “principled” decision-making was not reserved to
opponents of the Court’s substantive policy results.
The narrative provides the context for originalism’s imminent
emergence—a context of the shared search for a principled and orderly jurisprudence. Writing in 1973, G. Edward White sought it in
42
the interplay between realism and “reasoned elaboration.” White
was either unaware or uninterested in another answer that had been
latent for many years, but which had received a forceful articulation
just a few years earlier: the principle of original understanding. It is
to this that we now turn.
B. Originalism Rising
Gilbert Chesterton observed that the complexity of a belief is often an impediment to getting its defense underway, a torpor that
“arises, oddly enough, from an indifference about where one should
43
begin.” In the case of Old Originalism, politics dictated where to
44
begin: with the problem of judicial overreach.
When Richard Nixon ran for president in 1968 on a law and order
platform, one element of his campaign was his promise to appoint
45
“strict constructionists” to the bench. But this was more of an im46
pulse than a movement, an appeal to “irritable mental gestures” rather than to a cogent theory. Nixon’s politicking would have been an
appropriate target for Thomas Grey’s charge that conservative juris-

39
40

41
42
43
44

45
46

ment textualism was routed from the field. Id. at 282 (“The year 1937 marked the emergence of fullblown attacks on the Realists.”).
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12
(1959); White, supra note 38, at 288–93.
Wechsler, supra note 39, at 15 (“But must [courts] not decide on grounds of adequate
neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by others that the
principles imply?”).
E.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41–42 (1961)
(criticizing the Vinson Court for failing to develop discernible principles).
See White, supra note 38, at 296–302.
GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 153 (1908).
Compare the confirmation hearings of Justices Marshall and Rehnquist, as reported in
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–600 (2004)
[hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism].
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–32 (1977); Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 600.
Lionel Trilling employed this phrase to describe conservatism when he famously argued
that liberalism was not only the dominant tradition in America, it was the only tradition.
See LIONEL TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION: ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND SOCIETY, at
ix (1950).
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prudence amounted to little more than “ritualized repetition of the
47
familiar slogans,” but it played to the passions of an electorate that
was frustrated enough to call for the impeachment of Chief Justice
48
Earl Warren. This early commotion culminated in originalism—as
an ism—in the 1970s.
As the movement matured, these Old Originalists sorted themselves into new “original intent” and “original public meaning”
camps, although the standard narrative overdraws the distinction between them. This Subpart traces originalism’s intellectual development from the emergence of Old Originalism until it graduated to
New Originalism. It is not a comprehensive history, and old and New
Originalists overlap. Old Originalist Robert Bork was an advisor to
49
Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign. Similarly, Raoul Berger
50
continued writing responses until he was almost a century old. And
Michael McConnell is only one example of a “New Originalist” who
was already new in the 1980s. Randy Barnett used the term “New
51
Originalism” in 1999, but Keith Whittington’s important article con52
trasted it with “Old Originalism.” These constructs and Whittington’s descriptive analyses influenced the structure of what follows.

47

48

49

50
51
52

Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (remarking that
advocates espousing different theories of constitutional interpretation use appealing
rhetoric to signy their ideological commitments).
See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423,
439–40 (2004) (“The decisions in Mapp and Miranda were attacked as coddling criminals,
and the criminal justice system and the Supreme Court had become issues in the upcoming 1968 presidential election. ‘Impeach Earl Warren’ signs appeared along highways in
most parts of the country.”); see also Elizabeth A. Starrs, Protect Colorado Courts II, 35 COLO.
LAW. 5, 5 (2006) (describing calls for Chief Justice Warren’s impeachment as “a grassroots movement”).
Lloyd Grove, Robert Bork on Obama, the Supreme Court, Nixon & Being Mitt Romney’s Adviser,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2011, 1:37 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/robert-bork-obamasupreme-court-nixon-being-mitt-romneys-adviser-68317. See also Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate Afire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at A1 (discussing Bork’s conservative jurisprudence and legacy in the context of his role in the
Romney campaign).
Berger was born in 1901. His last article on HeinOnline is Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation, 1997 BYU L. REV. 517 (1997).
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 629–54 (1999)
(describing the ascendancy of New Originalism and arguing for its merit).
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 599–607; see also Keith E. Whittington, Is
Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 38–41 (2011) ) [hereinafter
Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?] (exploring the interplay between conservative ideology and originalist interpretation).
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1. Old Originalism
The nature of the current project–constructing an understanding
of originalism by tracing its origins–requires deferring a precise definition of originalism. But, at this point in the retelling, it is important to notice that the stirrings in the 1970s marked the emergence of something new. This something differed from what came
before in that it was neither a general milieu of interpretive method
nor the kind of simple textualism that was practiced in the decades
prior. Originalism thus considered–as a movement–began in earnest
in the 1970s. It is convenient to refer to this phase, ranging roughly
53
from 1970–1990, as “Old Originalism.”
It will not surprise many readers that an early contender for
originalism was Judge Robert Bork. His 1971 Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems stood on the shoulders of Professor
54
Herbert Wechsler, who was troubled with the rationale of Brown v.
55
Board. Judge Bork’s article embraced Wechsler’s call for application
of principles neutral as to the outcome but extended the demand for
neutrality to the derivation and definition of the principles in the first
place. He pointed out that it is no improvement if judges are free to
pluck their principles from the jurisprudential aether and then de56
fine them so as to suit the judge’s predilections. Bork cited Shelly v.
57
Kraemer and the state reapportionment cases as clear examples of
58
non-neutrality, whatever the desirability of their outcomes.
59
Bork’s article did not make much headway on its own, even if it is
60
now clear that a movement was gathering. One scholar, writing sev-

53

54
55

56
57
58
59

See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 599 (providing a sketch of the evolution of originalism, beginning with “old originalism,” that roughly tracks what follows
herein, though it is less narrative and more abbreviated).
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2
(1971) (using Wechsler’s argument about Supreme Court power as a “starting place”).
Wechsler, supra note 39, at 34 (“[I]s there a basis in neutral principles for holding that
the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail? I should like to
think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the opinion.”).
Bork, supra note 54, at 7 (advocating for neutral application of principles as well as a neutral definition of those principles in constitutional interpretation).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Bork, supra note 54, at 15–19.
A search for citations to the article in the five years after its publication yields approximately thirty results. Of these, many are confined to First Amendment scholarship or are
bulletins and indexes. Searches conducted using HeinOnline’s ScholarCheck feature
four articles citing to “47. Ind. L. J. 1” between 1970 and 1976. In one, the article is
miscited and attributed to “Beck.” S. Mac. Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 290, 310 n.59 (1972).
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eral years after Bork, suspected at least that Bork’s article was a trickle
61
His prediction was
that presaged an imminent flood of debate.
62
borne out almost immediately after it was made. In 1976, the case
was made by someone harder to obscure: a new Supreme Court Jus63
tice named William H. Rehnquist. In submitting Rehnquist’s nomination, President Nixon had declared that a judge “should not twist
or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal political
64
and social views.” Rehnquist’s articulation, strongly echoing Bork’s,
looked to the structure of constitutional government as articulated in
Marbury, recounting the Court’s troubled history in untethered moral
philosophizing, and making an argument from democratic legitima65
cy. Still, Rehnquist was Nixon’s third nominee and so far his campaign promise to initiate a regime of strict construction on the Court
had been toothless. It was, after all, Nixon appointee Blackmun who
66
wrote the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade.
History affords little opportunity to evaluate the impact of Justice
Rehnquist’s article. The next year, Raoul Berger released Government
by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, purporting
to demonstrate that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
67
not intend to abolish segregation. Government by Judiciary renounced
60

61

62
63
64

65
66
67

The article is now the tenth most cited law review article of all time. Fred R. Shapiro &
Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1489 (2012).
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975)
(“If the articles by Messrs. Bork, Linde, and Ely mark the emergence of an important
trend—as I suspect they do—this basic theoretical issue will no longer be swept under the
rug.”). Grey’s article was important in prompting a classification of the sides of the debate and in introducing early the idea of an unwritten constitution. Most of his article is
taken up observing that interpretivism would undermine many Supreme Court doctrines,
hardly a dealbreaker for originalists disturbed by judicial overreach. Id. at 710.
Of course, Professor Grey may have precipitated the debate with his article. See infra note
106 and accompanying text.
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976)
(proffering many of the arguments that originalism marshals in its more mature forms).
President Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to be Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States (Oct. 21, 1971), in PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
U.S.: RICHARD NIXON 1971, at 1053, 1054 (1972).
Rehnquist, supra note 63, at 703–06.
410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (noting that Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court).
BERGER, supra note 33, at 18 (“No trace of an intention by the Fourteenth Amendment to
encroach on State control—for example, of suffrage and segregation—is to be found in the
records of the 39th Congress.”). Berger completed the second edition when he was ninety-five years old, and the main text was unaltered “so that readers may in the future have
before them what excited so much controversy.” Id. at xxii. Thus all references in this article are to the second edition, which is available free online at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/675.
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68

as unwarranted Brown vs. Board of Education , what Pamela Karlan lat69
er called the “crown jewel of the United States Reports.” Berger’s controversial claim would prove difficult to marginalize and impossible to
ignore. His previous books had undermined the Nixon administration’s attempts at executive insulation, making it implausible to lump
70
him in with Nixon and Rehnquist. In addition, he was avowedly a
71
“deep-dyed liberal and lifelong Democrat.” His political dissonance
72
with other critics of living constitutionalism certainly bought him
some credibility, but it was his sheer tenacity that made him a veritable force of nature over the next decade.
“Heresy sometimes becomes so pervasive that it becomes the new
73
orthodoxy.” So wrote Robert Bork from his vantage in 1990. This
may explain why Government by Judiciary “stimulated an explosion of
74
academic interest in the framers’ intent,” some of which was de75
scribed as “slipshod and semihysterical.” The book itself was a compendium of history purporting to show that the Court had distorted
the Fourteenth Amendment past what its words could bear, arguing
almost by brute force that the intention of the framers must determine the meaning of the Constitution. Responses came from all
quarters but fall into two general categories. The first, with which
68
69
70
71

72
73
74
75

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do For You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the
Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1060 (2009).
See generally RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974);
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
Raoul Berger, Robert Bork’s Contribution to Original Intention, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1167
(1990). Berger added that he was “at the opposite political pole from Bork.” Id. Berger
elsewhere endorsed “the standard political principles of the moderate left of the Democratic party.” BERGER, supra note 33, at 336 (quoting Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV.
1307, 1322 (1979)).
On school prayer he was “diametrically opposed to . . . the Jesse Helms coterie . . . .”
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 131 (internal citation omitted).
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 7.
Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745,
753 (1983).
Forrest McDonald, Foreword to RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, at xv, xviii (2d
ed. 1997). Paul Brest, for example, repeatedly associated Berger with William Winslow
Crosskey, who in the 1950s published two volumes arguing, among other things, that the
president had power to enforce state law and that the Supreme Court had common law
but not judicial review powers. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 231 (1980) [hereinafter Brest, Misconceived Quest]. The implication is that relying on history can lead to wild aberrations. But see Ken Kersch, The
Curious Case of William Winslow Crosskey, Part I, LEGAL HISTORY BLOG (July 14, 2011),
http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/curious-case-of-william-winslow.html
(suggesting that Crosskey really was a proto-originalist in the sense of the term used herein).
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this Comment is not concerned, contains arguments that Berger’s
approach was normatively undesirable and that his conclusions about
original intent were interesting at best. These essentially normative
objections marked out some tentative battle lines between originalists
76
and nonoriginalists.
The second category shaped the contours of modern originalism
and thus is relevant for this Comment. Two scholars have achieved
iconic status as early and influential critics of Berger.
Paul Brest was first to arrive at the scene and first to use the term
77
“originalism.” Brest surveyed the world of originalist ideas, starting
with the more familiar “textualism,” pointing out that language
78
comes with both linguistic and social contexts. His critique of intentionalism is much broader. It identifies the oddity of a lawmaker’s
mental state governing the scope of a law, the further problem of another party applying that indeterminate intent, the conflict between
the lawmaker’s intended rules of construction and his intent about
79
the enactment, and the problem of group intent. Further, in the
context of our Constitution there is the additional problem of identi80
fying the adopters. Unimpressed, Berger called this “Paul Brest’s
81
Brief for an Imperial Judiciary.” Brest’s critique of originalism highlights originalism’s summing or aggregation problem—the difficulty in
ascertaining the intended meaning of a multimember body.
Another approach was to meet Berger on his own terms, “trying to
82
83
out-Berger Berger.” H. Jefferson Powell wrote an influential article
challenging original intent (or at least Berger’s version of it) on its

76

77

78
79

80
81
82
83

E.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981) (concluding that activists like
himself should “acknowledge that most of our writings are not political theory but advocacy scholarship”).
Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 75, at 204. Though the terms “original meaning” and
the like appear much earlier, originalism as a conceptual neologism appears to originate
with Brest. See Solum, supra note 7, at 2.
Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 75, at 205–09 (explaining the bounds of textualism
used in originalist constitutional interpretation theories).
Id. at 209–13 (examining the underlying concepts in intentionalism, which uses the
adopter’s perspective to support constitutional interpretation in contrast to textualism
and its use of original intent).
Id. at 213–15.
Raoul Berger, Paul Brest’s Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981).
Saphire, supra note 74, at 753.
The influence was inordinate. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic:
The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) (providing
historical analysis that seriously undermines Powell).
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84

own terms. According to Powell, the founding generation was possessed of two animating forces. On the one hand, an unlikely alliance between Puritan theology and enlightenment philosophy con85
spired to promote deep distrust of the interpretations of texts.
Pulling against this distrust, the common law had developed a robust
86
hermeneutic for conducting these kinds of interpretations. Examining the evidence in light of these forces, Powell argued, it becomes
clear that the founding generation was committed to a hermeneutic
87
of objective intent. The many instances of resort to legislative or
drafters’ intent are, upon close examination, really references to ob88
jective intent, a hermeneutic much like that applied to contracts.
Thus, goes the argument, those who cast their spear back to the
founding generation are misunderstanding what they have dragged
back. Berger did not lie down—his retribution was swift, and the evi89
dence he marshaled in his response was tedious and relentless.
Berger enlisted the usual luminaries such as Coke and Blackstone;
more effective, though, was his demonstration that Powell’s own
sources were not up to Powell’s task. Powell responded at some
90
91
length in reviewing Berger’s book on federalism. Berger, worried
that “victory be ‘adjudged not to him who had Truth on his side; but
the last word in the Dispute,’” responded in full with “The Founder’s
92
Views—According to Jefferson Powell.” The episode is typical of
Berger’s unyielding pugnacity. His critics were innumerable, so
much so that one of them remarked that “responding to Berger’s
93
thesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry” for scholars.

84
85
86
87
88

89
90

91
92

93

H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985).
Id. at 888–94.
Id. at 894–902.
Id. at 902–24.
Id. at 948 (“[A]t the time, [intent] referred to the ‘intentions’ of the sovereign parties to
the constitutional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution’s language and discerned
through structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions
of the framers or of anyone else.”).
Raoul Berger, “Original Intention” in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296
(1986).
See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1513 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN
(1987)).
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987).
Raoul Berger, The Founders’ Views—According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1034
(1989) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 494 (P.
Nidditch ed., 1975) (4th ed. 1700)).
Saphire, supra note 74, at 753 (noting that “[i]ssuing responses to his critics has become
somewhat of a cottage industry for Berger” and citing some examples).
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94

Berger authored over forty responses, leaving the impression that he
95
might singlehandedly fend off the academic countermobilization.
He was often “quite sharp in print to those with whom he disa96
gree[d]” responding vigorously with “relentless collation of quota97
tions” to his scholarly critics. And he was an equal-opportunity
98
brawler, answering even his more sympathetic critics. The firestorm,
99
centered on a man once “a hero to Nixon’s political opponents,”
would set the course for originalism’s future. Berger’s forcefulness
and ubiquity are a major reason why Old Originalists are identified as
intentionalists, for Berger is indeed one of the few identifiable com100
mitted intentionalists.
Keith Whittington notes that the Old Originalism was marked by
101
three characteristics. First, it was committed to judicial restraint.
Originalism was sometimes defended in purely instrumental terms as
the only way to constrain judges. This instrumental goal was spurred
by the intuition that there was something unseemly about judges
making sweeping national policy, thus leading to the second charac102
teristic: deference to legislative processes. Finally, most importantly for the purposes of this Comment, Old Originalists were taken as
103
intentionalists.
Government by Judiciary, like all of Berger’s ubiquitous writings, was a pandect of legislative history and forced the legal
world to answer to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
missiles from Brest, Powell, and others naturally honed in on Berger,
who was happy to engage them with his particular form of intentionalism.

94

95
96

97
98

99
100
101
102
103

He compiled a list of his articles which number 114. See BERGER, supra note 33, 485–91
(providing a list of the articles). A search on HeinOnline reveals 136 results with Berger
as “creator.” See HEINONLINE, http://heinonline.org (following “Resources” hyperlink;
then “Law Journal Library” hyperlink; then “advanced search” hyperlink; then inputting
“Raoul Berger” into the search by author field).
See BERGER, supra note 33, at xxi–xxii.
Sanford Levinson, Raoul Berger Pleads for Judicial Activism: A Comment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 773,
773 (1996); e.g., Berger, supra note 92, at 1033–34 (“In 1985, Jefferson Powell, then three
years out of law school, attempted . . . to read ‘original intent’ out of the common law.”).
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1485 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)).
E.g., Raoul Berger, The “Original Intent”—As Perceived by Michael McConnell, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 242 (1996). In typical Berger fashion, his thirty-five-page response has nearly 300
footnotes. Id. at 277 (concluding with footnote number 298).
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 115.
BERGER, supra note 33, at 403 (arguing for “[e]ffectuation of the draftsman’s intention”).
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 602.
Id. at 602–03.
Id. at 603.
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2. From Old to New
Originalism came of age in the mid-1980s. While some have offered that “[s]o thoroughly did Berger rout his critics that, after a
104
decade or so, they virtually stopped trying,” it is more plausible to
say that originalism itself left Berger behind. Even as the dominance
of the Warren and Burger Courts passed, Berger’s critics had convinced many sympathetic minds of weaknesses with intentionalism.
Steady criticism combined with political and judicial gains to pressure
originalists to refine their theory. This Subpart briefly recounts
originalism’s arrival out of the wilderness, or what Professor Balkin
105
would call from “off the wall” to “on the wall.”
In what must count as at least a minor concession, critics of
originalism began to pledge fidelity to the text as a first principle;
criticism of originalism was rooted in “how, not whether, to inter106
107
pret” the Constitution. One of these developments is worth noting briefly. It was in this same period that Bruce Ackerman annunci108
ated the prototype of his concept of “constitutional moments.” In
some ways, Ackerman’s work resonates with the liberals of the pro109
cess-restraint tradition. Ackerman is hardly a reactionary, and his
work in part justified the New Deal settlement as “the legitimation of
110
But it did so by appeal to the Constituthe activist welfare state.”
tion’s actual meaning in order to provide “constitutional vindication

104
105

106

107

108
109

110

McDonald, supra note 75, at xviii.
The use of the phrase in this context comes from Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 309–11 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion]. The essay was adapted as Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020, at 11 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); it was popularized in Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, THE
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/
06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/
258040/.
H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 659 n.1 (1987). Powell
somewhat emptily accuses originalists of appropriating the term interpretivism for themselves, describing it as sheer propaganda. Although his article does not cite to Grey, it is
unlikely he was unaware of the source of the label. Id.
E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 35 (1985) (“Any recognizable theory of
judicial review is interpretive . . . . [The] distinction… between theories that insist on and
those that reject interpretation . . . is more confusing than helpful.”).
Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1022.
Ackerman has written, among other articles, a liberal manifesto for a “liberal, progressive,
lefty” magazine. About Us, AM. PROSPECT, http://prospect.org/about-us; Bruce Ackerman, We Answer to the Name of Liberals, AM. PROSPECT (October 22, 2006), http://prospect.
org/article/we-answer-name-liberals-0.
Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1052.
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111

[for] the activist welfare state.”
Against the prevailing Progressive
narrative, Ackerman agreed with conservatives that the New Deal was
problematic when measured against the Constitution of 1787 and
112
Reconstruction amendments.
But, he argued, We the People had
actually and legitimately changed the Constitution through sustained
113
114
Ackerman’s thunderbolt meant that originalists
engagement.
would have to pay closer attention to constitutional theory—to what
the Constitution is and why it binds—or risk losing more than just
their method of interpretation.
The challenges to originalism pressed adherents to consider more
closely the concept of intent. The focus first shifted from framers’ in115
tent to ratifiers’ intent, a move that reflected the sentiments of some
116
117
founders and also responded to the movement’s critics. This refinement presaged a more fundamental one: a shift from subjective
to objective intent, or from intent to public meaning. A powerful
force in this transformation was “original meaning textualism’s pa118
tron saint,” Justice Antonin Scalia. In a 1986 speech, he exhorted
his audience to “change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning” on the premise that “ter119
minology is destiny.” As then-Judge Scalia finished his speech with
111
112
113
114

115

116

117
118
119

Id.
Id. at 1052–53.
Id. at 1055–56.
No claim is presented here as to whether Ackerman considers himself an originalist,
though he is sometimes taken as one. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 8, at 1849 n.1 (classifying Ackerman as a “broad originalist[]”).
Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41
VAND. L. REV. 507, 512 (1988) (“When we talk popularly about the framers’ intent, we really should be more precise and refer to the ratifiers’ intent . . . .”); M. E. BRADFORD,
ORIGINAL INTENTIONS: ON THE MAKING AND RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 34–86 (1993) (calling attention to the divergent intentions of Massachusetts, South Carolina, and North Carolina in ratifying the Constitution) (originally delivered as a public talk commemorating the bicentennial in 1989); Charles A. Lofgren, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 112 (1988) (“[H]ow the
ratifiers understood the Constitution . . . defines its meaning. The act of ratifying cannot
be dismissed with the adverb ‘merely.’”).
See James Madison in the House of Representatives, April 6, 1796, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 372, 374 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“If we were to
look . . . for the meaning of the instrument beyond [its] face . . . we must look for it, not
in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution.”).
See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 115, at 509 (criticizing the focus on original intent).
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO L.J. 1113, 1139 (2003).
Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986) in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A
SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1987), available at http://babel.hathitrust.
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those words, a senior Reagan advisor symbolically accepted the advice
120
The moment marked “the foron behalf of the Reagan coalition.
mal ascendancy of the doctrine of original meaning in modern
121
times.”
These developments signaled an increasingly complex and coherent network undergirding originalism. The contemporaneous rise of
the Federalist Society, an association of conservative law students and
lawyers, helped make the political and intellectual climate more favorable for originalism, as did its embrace by the Reagan White
122
House.
Notably, when President Ronald Reagan’s attorney general—a political appointee—gave his now-famous speech to the ABA
123
124
calling for “a Jurisprudence of Original Intention,” the press and
125
members of the Supreme Court were compelled to respond. The
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court was a “crucial pub126
lic test of originalism” that took place in the “bloody cross127
roads . . . where politics and law meet.” The lesson for present purposes is that although originalism was not first or primarily a political
phenomenon, it was both “the instrument and the beneficiary” of
128
conservative legal mobilization.

120

121
122
123
124
125

126
127

128

org/cgi/pt?q1=106;id=mdp.39015019842932;view=1up;seq=122;start=1;size=10;
page=search;num=106#view=1up;seq=122.
See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
47, 48 n.10 (2006) (recounting Lawson’s memories of the speech, which include T. Kenneth Cribb, the Counselor to the Attorney General, accepting Justice Scalia’s recommendation shortly after he finished his speech).
Id.
See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2010).
Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9,
1985), http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/meese/1985/07-09-1985.pdf, at 7.
See Why Give That Speech?, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at A18.
See Justice William J. Brennan, Speech given at the Georgetown University Text and
Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985)(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
supremecourt/democracy/sources_document7.html).
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 161.
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 269. For insightful explorations of this dimension, see
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 133–60 (exploring “Originalism in the Era of Ronald Reagan”);
Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 191, 191 (2008) (exploring originalism’s role in the 2008 Supreme Cout decision
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE
CONSTITUTION: RACE, LABOR, AND CONSERVATIVE POLITICS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE
NEW RIGHT (forthcoming) (examining in chapter 14 the tension between Meese’s
originalism and Solicitor General Fried’s strict constructionism). See generally TELES, supra
note 122.
Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009). Greene does not
describe the relationship sympathetically.
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Accounts of originalism’s history often overstate the shift from intent to meaning. Though there is a discernible trend from intent to
understanding to public meaning, “the shift . . . was not a clean
129
break.”
The untheorized nature of originalism in these years precipitated some loose language; intent and meaning are overlapping
concepts and often used interchangeably. The next Part examines
these conceptual problems in greater detail. A related qualification is
that the concept of “intent” is by no means absent from modern
130
originalism. Not all originalists accepted (or accept) the validity of
131
the Brest-Powell line of attacks, and the supposedly extinct intentionalists persist to this day (though I will call them Low Original132
ists). There is an upshot to this chapter, though: originalism disavows the relevance of anyone’s “secret” intent. Whatever may have
been the preference of the early intentionalists, no scholar now advocates “tak[ing] the top off the heads of authors and framers—like
soft-boiled eggs—to look inside for the truest account of their brain
133
states at the moment that the texts were created.”
Thus, charges
about the difficulty of examining particular mental states of particular individuals are averted from the outset.
3. Conclusion
It is fitting to end this story of Old Originalism where it began,
with Judge Robert Bork. Bork emblematically stands between the
Old Originalism and the New Originalism. An early intellectual figure in the movement, the Senate’s rejection of his nomination
marked the confluence of churning social, legal, and political currents. Shaped by that tumultuous spectacle, his 1990 book The Tempting of America provides a useful demarcation line between the eras of

129
130

131
132
133

Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239, 251 (2009).
Compare Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230–33 (1988) [hereinafter Kay
1988] (criticizing the “‘text-by-itself’ idea” as having as “little resemblance to our[]” system of governance as “rules inferred from the entrails of sacrificed animals”), with Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 703, 704 (2009) [hereinafter Kay 2009] (“[R]ecourse to the original intentions
provides a link that is essential to the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review.”).
As noted above, Berger’s own arguments were never really answered. Kay 2009, supra
note 130, at 705 n.9 (citing Natelson, supra note 83).
Richard Kay is probably the most prominent of these.
Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV.
751, 759 (1987).
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134

originalism.
As to the Old, Bork builds his normative case almost
135
entirely on an appeal to judicial restraint. Bork’s positive argument
is abbreviated, more powerful rhetorically than philosophically.
Marking the transition, Bork is able to write,
Though I have written of the understanding of the ratifiers of the
Constitution, since they enacted it and made it law, that is actually a
shorthand formulation, because what the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time
136
would have understood the words to mean.

Characteristic of the New, he undertakes a more syllogistic and
methodological exposition of his theory.
The story of originalism recounted herein presents a few salient
details. First, originalists do not regard originalism as an innovation.
Rather, it is a spirited expression of what was “the dominant form of
137
constitutional interpretation during most of [this] nation’s history.”
138
139
This lineage is a sort of creation myth for originalists.
But even
leaving intact that myth, originalists should note that ambitious judges predate Chief Justice Vinson or even the Lochner Court. Likewise,
originalism was not alone in its concerns about self-government; students and critics alike should regard it as an interlocutor in a broader
intellectual endeavor. Democracy and the rule of law are concerns
for all sides. While Old Originalists felt compelled to assert these historical bona fides, by 1989 Justice Scalia, with only some exaggeration, could describe originalism as the only game in town with no
140
trace of the defensiveness that marked earlier writings.
Nevertheless, originalism did arise as a response to the emanation
of liberal politics from the Supreme Court. It is unavailing to deny
originalism’s historical connection to and ideological affinity with po134

135

136
137
138

139
140

Jack Balkin agrees with this demarcation. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 446 n.51 (2007) (calling Bork’s book a
“transitional document between original understanding and original meaning” and
providing a summary of Bork’s arguments).
Bork makes arguments for the propriety of judicial restraint, but the tenor of the book is
such that it is clearly a case against naughty judges. For example, Bork dedicates the first
130 pages to recounting examples of judicial misconduct throughout all eras of constitutional jurisprudence. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 1–132.
Id. at 144.
Executive Summary in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 118,
at i.
The term is not pejorative. For a perspective on myth as truth, see C. S. Lewis, Myth Became Fact, in GOD IN THE DOCK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 63, 64–67 (Walter
Hooper ed., 1970). See also J.R.R. Tolkien, Mythopoeia, in TREE AND LEAF (1989).
Appeals to The Federalist, Chief Justice Marshall, Joseph Story, etc., are legion. One can
choose almost any originalist work cited herein and find an example.
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855 (1989).
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litical conservatism.
The charge that this imperils the originalist
142
argument is a kind of collective ad hominem or “Bulverism,” addressing the motives of the argument’s proponents rather than the
143
argument itself. It is, however, a prerequisite for credible and constructive dialogue that originalists admit this fact. As the conversation
144
145
continued into the 1990s, libertarians and progressives crafted
their own originalist theories. Thus, the strict identification with conservative politics has become more of a loose correlation.
II. NEW ORIGINALISM – A SYSTEMATIC JURISPRUDENCE: HIGH
ORIGINALISM AND LOW ORIGINALISM
With the passing of the Old Originalism–reactive and restraintist,
146
a loyal opposition–came a “boon tide of originalist scholarship” that
makes it impractical to continue the historian’s approach of the pre147
vious section.
Originalism, no longer off the wall, found itself a fledgling theory
in a big legal world. Originalists responded by growing, adapting,
evolving—a development some critics considered ironic given
148
originalism’s commitment to historical meaning.
Michael
McConnell, who would become “undoubtedly the most prominent
149
New Originalist,” warned against stultification in a review of Raoul
150
Berger’s book. McConnell criticized Berger’s work as “radically incomplete” and “fail[ing] to link[] discoveries about the issue at hand
151
to any overarching understanding of the . . . Constitution.”
McConnell was an early adopter of New Originalism, sensing the

141
142

143
144
145
146
147
148

149
150
151

See Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, supra note 52, at 29 (noting that originalism is often linked to conservative politics).
See C. S. LEWIS, ‘Bulverism’, in GOD IN THE DOCK 271, 273 (Walter Hooper ed., 1970)
(“[Y]ou must show that a man is wrong before you start explaining why he is wrong. The
modern method is to assume without discussion that he is wrong and then distract his attention from this (the only real issue) by busily explaining how he became so silly.”).
Cf. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, supra note 52, at 34 n.13 (discussing an
argument about judicial and political behavior).
Most notably, Randy Barnett.
E.g., Jack M. Balkin.
Barnett, supra note 51, at 650. The meaning of the term “boon tide” is itself a mystery.
A summary with useful citations appears in Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 118, at 1140–
41.
See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 129, at 246 (“Originalists, who have long criticized the
notion of a living constitution, have themselves followed a living, evolving approach to
constitutional interpretation.”).
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 608.
McConnell, supra note 97.
Id. at 1485–86.
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need to connect originalism to a broader moral and political narrative.
In order to answer this normative challenge, originalism faced its
greatest methodological challenge. Clearly the Constitution does not
answer every question our politics raises. If judges should not engage
in moral reasoning or rule based on well-reasoned policy conclusions,
how then should they determine the Constitution’s meaning where it
is silent, ambiguous, or the application of the text runs out? In a
1989 survey of originalism, one commentator observed that
“[t]houghtful originalists . . . concede that factors other than original
152
intent must be given some weight in decisions.”
As a preliminary matter, several unfamiliar concepts must enter
the discussion. First, this Part presents a diversity of originalist theories, a diversity that has convinced some that “the inconsistency of
originalism—the incoherence of the movement—runs much deeper.
153
And it always has.”
Though originalists disagree on much, and
though there is no official gatekeeper, all of them hold what Law154
The fixation thesis
rence Solum has dubbed the fixation thesis.
states that the semantic meaning—as distinguished from the applicative meaning (what does the new tax code mean for my bottom line?)
and the teleological meaning (the meaning of life, the meaning of a
fence newly erected between neighbors)—of a text is fixed at the time
155
of enactment. A second concept is “speaker’s meaning,” especially
156
as contrasted with “sentence meaning.” The distinction is a matter
of complex philosophy of language, but for present purposes the
speaker’s meaning implicates the author or speaker in determining
the semantic content of the utterance. It is closely related to the idea
of intentions. Sentence meaning, in contrast, is determined by re157
solving “the words and phrases that constitute the utterance.” The
source of the words is irrelevant to determining their meaning.
With these concepts in hand, this Part will undertake a more systematic survey of originalism as it stands now in the midst of original158
ism’s “Thirty Years War.” The scholarly conversation has reflected a
deficient taxonomy that has wasted resources, in part by discussing a
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085,
1105 (1989).
Colby & Smith, supra note 129, at 249.
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 118, at 1135.
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type of originalism–original methods originalism–that no one holds.
Instead, the thesis of this Part is that the degree to which the “speaker’s meaning” is a relevant concept is the appropriate dividing line
between two camps within originalism.
A. How Not To Divide
The previous Part described the shift from “original intent” to
“original public meaning” as a historical matter. This move is best
regarded not as an abandonment of original intent, but as a clarification as to which intent, or whose intent, is the object of the inquiry.
The overlap and conflation of these two concepts has caused no end
of trouble for originalists and their critics. The reason is partly historic, described above, but also partly owes to an underconceptualized
account of the various flavors of originalism. In order to get an idea
of the contours of modern originalism, it is useful to turn to a locus
classicus of originalism and examine the exchange between two eminent legal scholars.
In the year 1997, originalism was ascendant enough that a constitutional historian could declare that “the turn to originalism seems so
159
general that citation is almost beside the point.”
The same year,
Princeton University’s Tanner Lecture featured Justice Antonin Scalia as its keynote speaker with comments by eminent scholars: historian Gordon Wood, constitutional law professor and litigator Laurence
Tribe, comparative constitutional scholar Mary Ann Glendon, and
renowned legal theorist Ronald Dworkin. The lectures were adapted
160
to print as A Matter of Interpretation. The exchange between Justice
Scalia and Ronald Dworkin sends us on our way. Justice Scalia presented a familiar defense of originalism as the opening lecture:
[W]e do not really look for subjective legislative intent. We look for a
sort of “objectified” intent—the intent that a reasonable person would
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris. . . . [I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government . . . to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver
meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated . . . . It is the law
161
that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.

159
160
161

Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1592 n.14
(1997).
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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Dworkin observed that Justice Scalia often repairs to legislative in162
tent or purpose in avoiding “silly” consequences. Dworkin observed
that there are two types of originalism based on the intention that
163
one might seek. The first is semantic originalism, which seeks the
semantic intention or what the lawmakers “intended to say in enact164
The second is expectation originaling the language they used.”
ism, which holds that the text “should be understood to have the
165
consequences that those who made them expected them to have.”
Justice Scalia embraced Dworkin’s distinction and pledged fealty to
166
semantic originalism. Here Dworkin identified a first useful distinction: the conflation of semantic intention and expectation inten167
tion.
But Dworkin completely missed a second distinction: Justice Scalia’s finer point about the applicative scope of a semantically fixed
meaning as compared with a principle whose meaning is subject to
168
change.
It is easier to demonstrate this with their example: the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punish169
ment.” Justice Scalia’s position is that the death penalty cannot fall
within the meaning of the Amendment because the framers obviously
countenanced its use. Dworkin pointed out that Justice Scalia must
170
choose between two translations of the text: either it prohibits
“punishments generally thought cruel at the time” or it “lay[s] down
an abstract principle forbidding whatever punishments are in fact
171
cruel and unusual.” Justice Scalia called the first alternative a caricature of his position and averred that the Amendment is indeed an
abstract moral principle but it is one whose content is fixed at its enact162
163
164
165
166
167

168

169
170

171

Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 115, 115–16 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Comment].
Id. at 119.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 119.
See Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 144 (agreeing with Dworkin’s conception of “semantic intention” and claiming to follow it).
Justice Scalia and Dworkin may have been too hasty to agree that semantic intention is
irrelevant. Semantic intention may implicate speaker’s meaning which may be relevant to
interpretation.
I discovered that Michael McConnell beat me to this observation by fifteen years. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1997) (describing Dworkin’s “familiar fallacy of black and white reasoning”).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Dworkin has in mind a sophisticated philosophical notion of translation, though his
footnote here states in its entirety “[r]eference to work of Quine, Grice, and Davidson.”
Dworkin, Comment, supra note 162, at 117 n.6.
Id. at 120.
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ment.
Because Justice Scalia then inferred that meaning from the
presence of capital punishment in eighteenth-century America, Professor Dworkin accused him of resorting to the caricature he just dis173
owned.
But Justice Scalia explicitly disclaimed the dichotomy and
argued that the moral principle is in the text and derives its meaning
from the original period. Thus it applies “to all sorts of tortures quite
174
unknown at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.”
The
electric chair is perhaps an example—Justice Scalia is not rendered
speechless because the founding generation had literally no opinion
on it. There is, then, a difference between what a phrase—even an abstract one—means at the time of enactment and how its enactors
175
would expect it to apply.
Old Originalism’s debate over intent and meaning maps onto this
exchange, but here we view the overlapping concepts at a higher resolution. The idea of “intent” implicates semantic intent (what a
speaker intended to say) as much as it does expectation intent (what
a speaker intended his statement to accomplish). And, though not
explicitly, a closer look clarifies the role of abstraction. If a statement
is designedly an abstract principle, does that license future receivers
to interpret it according to how their generation uses the words?
176
Dworkin conflates “dated” with “concrete” : to say a principle is abstract does not require saying that it is also evolving or relative. How
the original authors anticipated the law would apply—the original expected applications—is irrelevant in resolving the meaning of the text.
Dworkin’s description of Justice Scalia was thus more than caricature.
Anyone who used original expectations in that way would reduce
“principle” beyond even the status of “category” to mere “sets” or
177
“aggregations.” Words, on this account, would be useful only to de172

173

174
175

176
177

Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 145 (“What it abstracts . . . is not a moral principle of
‘cruelty’ that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the existing society’s assessment of what is cruel.”).
See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1256–57 (1997) (describing Justice Scalia’s arguments and arguing that “they endorse exactly the view that Justice Scalia . . . had rejected as caricature”).
Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 145.
See McConnell, supra note 168, at 1284 (“Mainstream originalists recognize that the
Framers’ analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could
have changed and made them wrong.”). But see Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The
Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO L.J. 569 (1998) (making an extended case for
Dworkin’s dichotomy).
Dworkin, Comment, supra note 162, at 121–22 (categorizing “concrete [and] dated rules ”
together).
See Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 189, 195 (2010) (“Imagine an interpretive approach that tried to eschew ‘principles’ and categories in favor of some sort of radical nominalism in which
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scribe a specific set of intended objects. The incoherence and impracticability of this position would hardly evade a first-year law student, let alone a lawyer of Justice Scalia’s caliber.
Either through ellipsis or carelessness, originalists may sometimes
178
sound like they are relying on original expected applications.
But
the notion of an “original-expected-applications originalism” as a
179
theoretical variant appears to be a construct of critics.
Lawrence
Rosenthal’s recent article is an excellent example. In purporting to
show that originalism in theory and in practice devolves to nonoriginalism, Rosenthal provides a rough sketch of originalist camps.
He first cuts the originalist world in half, dividing it between “‘origi180
nal-expected-applications’ originalism” and “semantic originalism.”
The discussion of the first is curiously lacking in citations to any of its
181
theorists. Rosenthal charges Justice Scalia as such but then con182
cedes that he is a semantic originalist.
In the introduction to the
section, Rosenthal names John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport as
183
of a similar stripe, but fails to discuss their original-methods
184
His other category—semantic originaloriginalism in the article.
ism—comprises, I suggest, the entirety of originalist thought. Rosen185
thal divides this world into liberal, libertarian, and conservative.
There is something to this division, since a scholar’s normative com-

178
179

180
181
182
183
184

185

words are understood to refer not to universals or real categories, but only to the particular items or instances contemplated by the person uttering the words. . . . On this assumption, constitutional interpretation would be impossible.”).
E.g., Justice Scalia’s remarks that the death penalty was prevalent and thus could not have
been prohibited.
Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1190 (2012); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24
CONST. COMMENT. 383, 390 (2007) (“[A] surprising number of other smart and careful
scholars appear to believe, just as Balkin does, that expectation originalism enjoys vibrant
support.”) (citing as examples KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
47–58 (2006) and Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 265 (2002)).
Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 1189.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1191.
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (defending
their “original methods orginalism”).
Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 1213–32 (discussing the three types of semantic originalism).
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mitments necessarily motivate him to different goals.
the next Subpart pursues a different classification.

186

Nevertheless,

B. A Better Taxonomy
The stark divide between semantic originalism and originalexpected-applications originalism is illusory. But this is not to say that
originalist theories do not differ in significant ways. At risk of enlist187
ing in the “small army of eager bouncers” that polices the boundaries of originalism, this Comment proposes a different taxonomy, one
that is politics-blind. Instead, originalism is roughly divided between
“High Originalists” and “Low Originalists.” The High Originalists
engage in abstractions and seek a kind of theoretical purity. Low
Originalists take a more natural or organic approach to interpretation. High Originalists reject speaker’s meaning; Low Originalists
think that is impossible or unwise.
As with any intellectual taxonomy, there are degrees of separation
with overlap and migration along the spectrum. But in contrast to
the prevailing division based on expectations, or the political taxonomy Rosenthal employs, this one accounts for Jack Balkin as easily as
it accounts for Michael McConnell. I will even claim to explain the
judicial riddle known as Justice Antonin Scalia.
1. The High Originalists
We begin with the High Originalists. At this end of the spectrum
are those who adhere to a purer form of textual originalism. This
188
mode of interpretation is called “semantic originalism” and is
189
On these models,
commonly identified with “New Originalism.”
the product of the legislative process—the law—takes on an almost pla190
tonic status.
Once it takes its place in the code, an interpreter as-

186

187
188
189

190

See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A
Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2005) (charging Barnett
with allowing his libertarian politics to skew his constitutional analysis).
Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 177, 177 (2010).
The term seems to have originated with Dworkin as discussed above. See supra notes 162–
67 and accompanying text.
E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 1210 (“Semantic originalism . . . is sometimes referred
to as the ‘New Originalism.’”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 120, at 48–49 (asserting
that “the weight of originalist opinion today” employs an objective reasonable person
standard).
E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994) (observing that originalists “give priority to [the plain dictionary meaning] . . . because it and it alone is law”).
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certains its meaning only by engaging a technical linguistic analysis.
Exponents of this view call for a reasonable person analysis, though
191
that reasonable person may be “an ordinary user of the language”
192
or “a skilled user of words” or even “the reasonable person of the
193
The search for this meaning starts in contemporaneous diclaw.”
tionaries and grammar books and consults public statements only for
194
additional evidence. Contracts professor-cum-constitutional scholar
195
Randy Barnett, among others, offers a defense of this model based
196
Barnett applies to the Constituon the Constitution’s writtenness.
tion the four functions of formality in contract—evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and clarifying—and shows that all apply to a written
197
constitution. These are at best consequentialist reasons for adhering to the text, a weakness Barnett senses as he then vindicates the
198
Constitution’s writtenness with political theory.
Other semantic
199
originalists legitimate the method in more lawyerly terms.
Larry Solum defends this position in abstruse philosophical detail,
in what has been called “the outstanding manifestation” of a “highly
200
theoretical enterprise.”
Solum declares that “[w]hen we seek the
meaning of a legal text . . . our aim is to discover the conventional
semantic meaning of the expression type and to resolve vagueness
and ambiguity by reference to context of the particular utterance to201
ken.” The work is dense and unpolished, introducing a plethora of
concepts from the philosophy of language that are too complex to
recount here. A notable aspect of Solum’s work—and one that marks
him out as a High Originalist—is his insistence that semantic originalism is purely descriptive: the text has an objective meaning as a mat191
192
193
194
195
196

197
198
199

200
201

Id. at 554.
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 59, 61 (1988).
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 120, at 73. The reasonable person construct here is explicitly a “formidable intellectual figure.” Id.
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 190, at 552–53.
E.g., id. at 552 (listing Professor Akhil Reed Amar, Robert Bork, Professor John Hary Ely,
and Justice Antonin Scalia as endorsers of this methodology).
Randy E. Barnett, supra note 51, at 629–54. Barnett makes the same arguments in his
book, RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004).
Barnett, supra note 51, at 630–31.
Id. at 636–43.
See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 119, at 51–70 (dissecting Chief Justice Marshall’s intonation that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding” as it relates
to the meaning of the Constitution and constitutional interpretation (quoting McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
Smith, supra note 177, at 198, 198 n.29.
Solum, supra note 154, at 33.
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202

ter of logic.
Whether we should use that meaning is of course a
normative question, but the claim is that determining the meaning is
in this sense a highly rationalist endeavor. Solum explicitly concludes
that speaker’s meaning (framer’s meaning in the constitutional context) is impossible and thus only the sentence meaning (clause mean203
ing) can succeed.
Joining the New Originalists is a merry band of heterodox
204
originalists. Spurred in part by an appropriation of neorepublican
205
historical scholarship, political liberals have developed their own
206
versions of originalism. Dworkin advanced a “moral reading” of the
Constitution rooted firmly in his understanding of semantic original207
208
ism, even as he claimed “opposition to any form of originalism.”
209
Dworkin is a prolific scholar —his interpretive method is of a piece
210
with his concept of “law as integrity” and building a complete ac211
count of Dworkin’s theory is quite difficult. He speaks in places of
constitutional text as a speech act conforming to speaker’s meaning
theory, though he seems to allow this contextual reading to influence
212
the meaning of the text only in limited circumstances.
Dworkin
thus advocates a version of High Originalism in which text that uses
value-laden terms becomes an evolving moral principle for judges to
apply.

202
203
204

205
206

207
208
209

210
211

212

Id. at 8.
Id. at 41–50.
See William Hogeland, Founding Fathers, Founding Villains: The New Liberal Originalism,
BOS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2012, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/us/foundingfathers-founding-villains-william-hogeland (describing the positions and arguments of
modern liberal originalists).
Key figures are Bernard Bailyn and his principle students Jack Rakove and Gordon S.
Wood.
See O’NEILL, supra note 5, 198–205, 213–15 (describing developments in liberal originalism). The strategy was at least partially self-conscious. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on
the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997).
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996).
Dworkin, supra note 173, at 1258 n.18
Dworkin is the second most-cited legal scholar in the twentieth century. See Fred R.
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000) (listing Dworkin
as the second most-cited legal scholar behind Richard A. Posner).
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 94 (1986).
See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as an Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 49 (2000) (attempting to parse out Dworkin’s changing arguments concerning originalism); see also
McConnell, supra note 168, at 1270 (“It is not too much to say that there are two
Dworkins . . . .”).
See Ronald Dworkin, Reflections on Fidelity, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1799, 1816 (1997) (analyzing a case in terms of “speech practice”).
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There are many others, but Jack Balkin is the most conspicuous
heterodox originalist. Playing to the same ambiguity Dworkin exploits, Balkin famously declared his commitment to “the method of
214
text and principle” in a 2007 article. Balkin’s method looks quite similar to Dworkin’s: where Dworkin finds an abstract moral principle,
Balkin sees a “framework” that “delegate[s] the articulation and implementation of important constitutional principles to the fu215
ture[.]” Professor Balkin sounds not unlike Randy Barnett or even
Justice Antonin Scalia in arguing for originalism from principles of
writtenness, popular sovereignty, and fidelity to custom and nation
216
alike. And the hermeneutic of text and principle is a thoroughgo217
ing originalist enterprise, traceable from John Marshall through
218
219
Robert Bork to Justice Scalia. The road seems safe, the way familiar–Balkin is not merely calling himself an originalist and then doing
something else. Balkin deftly and cannily employs High Originalism
to reach the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment enshrines a
220
right to abortion in the Constitution.
The High Originalists are characterized by a highly systematic approach to constitutional interpretation, an aspiration to “a theory
221
working itself pure.”
On the premise that “documents can have
meanings that are latent in their language and structure even if they
222
are not obvious to observers at a specific moment in time,” the theory avoids looking at individuals or communities in favor of an objective meaning of utterances. But it is also marked by an unsettling
range of outcomes. Some High Originalists reach conclusions typi-

213

214
215
216
217

218
219
220

221
222

See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311 (1996).
Balkin, Abortion, supra note 105, at 293.
Jack M. Balkin, supra note 134, at 453.
Id. at 428–42.
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the
nature of the instrument, but from the language.”).
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 146–53 (applying the principle of judicial neutrality).
Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 145 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment is “rooted in
the moral perceptions of the time”).
Balkin, Abortion, supra note 105, at 299–300 (“[E]qual rights for women are fully consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and its underlying principles of equal citizenship and opposition to caste and class legislation.”).
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 118, at 1114.
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 341 n.51 (2002).
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223

cally associated with originalism.
Others, though, conclude their
systematization with perplexing results, ranging from a constitutional
224
presumption of liberty to two different constitutional rights to abor225
tion.
2. The Low Originalists
Looking on aghast from the other pole are the Low Originalists.
The term is not pejorative–indeed, the tenor of this Comment is that
the Low Originalists have the better position. It also should not be
taken to suggest a lower degree of academic or logical rigor. Low
Originalism means an interpretive model that accords some level of
relevance to speaker’s meaning or intent. The reason I do not label
them “intentionalists” is to distinguish them from that strand of Old
Originalism. Low Originalists do not seek private meanings, but they
do look at the constitutional text as an act of human communication.
Some Low Originalists are designedly simplistic. Steven D. Smith
offers a representative position. Acknowledging that he risks being
226
charged with “obscurantism, anti-intellectualism, and yokelism,” he
boldly proceeds to criticize the mess high theory has made of
227
originalism. Himself an “originalist wannabe,” he is nevertheless
228
deeply troubled by what has become of originalist theory. In his estimation, it has become that which it beheld, a writ for unrestrained
judicial activism. Elsewhere, Smith frames the debate in broader ideological terms, lamenting the perfectionist tendencies among
229
originalists.
That Balkin is able to reasonably (if cleverly) declare
himself an originalist is a product of removing the Constitution from
230
This broader cultural point can be
the realm of human affairs.
made at great length; here it will have to suffice to mention that it is

223
224
225
226

227
228
229

230

E.g., Calabresi, supra note 186, at 1097 (accusing Barnett of being unrealistic and “overlook[ing] some important originalist and normative arguments about judicial activism”.
See generally BARNETT, supra note 196.
Balkin, Abortion, supra note 105, at 319–36 (discussing arguments for the right to abortion
from due process and the privileges or immunities clauses).
Smith, supra note 3, at 223; see also Larry Alexander, Simple-minded Originalism, in THE
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87 (Grant
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
Steven D. Smith, The Writing of the Constitution and the Writing on the Wall, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 391, 391 (1996).
Smith, supra note 3, at 224–27.
See Smith, supra note 177, at 192–93 (describing as naïve originalists’ belief “that their
approach to interpretation ‘purges adjudication of discretion’ and that it delivers ‘fixity
and determinacy’” (internal citations omitted)).
Id. at 190–91.
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typically nonoriginalists who sought this kind of transcendence.
Like Daedalus of myth, High Originalists aspire to heavenly places;
the Constitution, though, is a human artifice.
A more philosophical case is available for speaker’s meaning or
Low Originalism. The notion of a text standing above and outside
any authorship is counterintuitive. An important article by Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash identifies five different ways in which
232
the reading of texts is impossible without inferring intent.
Given
the impossibility of intentions-free interpretation, the article suggests
that High Originalism’s real problems stem from questions of eviden233
tiary reliability or of constructing an idealized author.
Elsewhere, proudly claiming the mantle of “simple-minded”
234
originalist, Alexander presents a useful illustration. Imagine a person hands you a piece of paper and tells you that he has to follow the
235
commands thereon. If he tells you that the paper fell from a moving vehicle and the marks are dirt and the like, you will have to con236
clude that there are no normative propositions on the paper. If he
tells you that the paper was given him by some authority to which he
was bound, you will want to know who the authors are and in what
237
language they communicated.
Resonating with these linguistic arguments, the arch-Low
Originalist Richard Kay launches a multipronged attack on High
238
Originalism. Like Alexander and Prakash, Kay challenges the concept of constitutional communication that underlies High Originalist
theory, as well as the “supposed invulnerability” to the aggregation
239
and original methods objections. As a response to these early criti240
cisms, then, High Originalism unnecessarily cedes ground. Kay further notes that High and Low Originalism will often yield the same
conclusions, but that when the models diverge, High Originalism
241
misleads the interpreter. Coming full circle in this outline of Low
231
232

233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

Id.
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free
Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 972–82 (2004) (outlining and
explaining the five arguments).
Id. at 982–89.
Alexander, supra note 225, at 87.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Kay 1988, supra note 130.
Kay 2009, supra note 130, at 707.
Id.
Id. at 704, 714–19 (showing “that reliance on public meaning distracts the interpreter
from the connection between the normative force of the Constitution and the founding
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Originalism, Kay demonstrates that High Originalism “leads to an en242
larged range of plausible outcomes.” Imagine the power and range
of a judge equipped with Jack Balkin’s method, and even a fraction of
his acumen!
Low Originalism calls for understanding the Constitution as an
inherently human enterprise, written in the actual language of an actual people. It rejects the metaphysical subtleties of High Originalism
along with the sundry forms of nonoriginalism.
C. The Crisis of High Originalism
Interpretive theory is primarily concerned with what to do when
the text is underdetermined—when its meaning runs out before it can
resolve the case at hand. High Originalism appears to be particularly
susceptible to this infirmity, coming under criticism from historians
and legal theorists alike. One eminent historian, himself quite invested in what our foundational documents mean, details what he
243
calls the “poverty of public meaning originalism.” And a prominent
originalist scholar writes of the “impossibility” of “intention free in244
This weakness of High Originalism is straining the
terpretation.”
denomination’s standing.
Some look for traction in distinguishing between interpretation
245
and construction.
“Construction” may mean the development of
constitutional norms within an existing framework, which readers will
246
recognize as the basis of all constitutional law curriculum. But the
concept can be simply the science of judicial application and the
rules that courts adduce to guide them in their work. This only restates the problem, if with more clarity: where should a judge look
when the text admits of two interpretations that would resolve the
case differently?

242
243
244
245

246

events, whereas recourse to the original intentions provides a link that is essential to the
legitimacy of constitutional judicial review”).
Id. at 704.
Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning
Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011).
Alexander & Prakash, supra note 231.
Barnett and Solum endorse the distinction. McGinnis and Rappaport reject it. Whittington uses the terms somewhat differently. As I explain below, Whittington is probably a
Low Originalist.
Whittington uses the term this way. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 35–36 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION]; see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).

May 2014]

THE CHURCH OF ORIGINALISM

1565

A forthcoming article takes us back to the earliest days of the republic to explore the question. Donald Drakeman and Joel Alicea
247
look at the very early case of Hylton v. United States and find the Jus248
tices running headlong into this problem almost immediately. After recounting the fascinating history of an early challenge to Congress’s taxing power, the article exhausts the sources admissible to a
High Originalist: dictionaries, grammars, highly-publicized usages.
At the end of their thorough undertaking, the article’s two authors,
like the Justices in 1796, cannot agree on the objective meaning of
249
the term “excise.”
The Justices must go beyond public-meaning
sources and consult such low affairs as ratifying conventions and
statements by contemporary lawmakers. The article concludes that
“New Originalism” is inherently limited, and when its meaning runs
250
out, it is useful to resort to “Old Originalism.” The substance of the
conclusion is exactly right, but the labels are misleading and unhelpful. What we know as New Originalism comprises both High and Low
Originalists, so the fault illuminated by Hylton is not properly laid at
its feet. It is High Originalism that leads to a dead-end, and the escape is in the Low Originalism of today, not the untheorized intentionalism of the past.
Another chief criticism of originalism is that it is just as “activist” as
the theories it seeks to displace. This line of attack also comes from
within and from without. Robert Post and Reva Siegel—certainly no
reactionaries—have written that originalism is no less the fruit of pop251
ular constitutional impulses than any other theory.
Originalism’s

247
248

249
250
251

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
Joel Alicea & Donald Drakeman, The Limits of the New Originalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW
1162, 1163 (2013) (noting that the Hylton case might “be far more important for its lessons in originalism” because “[w]ith no clear precedents either on the tax issue itself or,
more importantly, how judicial review should be done, the advocates in the
case . . . battled over how to interpret the Constitution”).
Id. at 1206–14; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012)
(using the ambiguity of tax issues to avoid careful definition of types of taxes).
Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 248, at 1218–19.
See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020, at 25, 26 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (demonstrating “that claims
of originalism asserted in the late twentieth century expressed such a substantive and
mobilizing constitutional vision”); Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 546 (2006) (“Originalism
remains even now a powerful vehicle for conservative mobilization, as can clearly be seen
in recent popular opposition to the citation of foreign law.”); Siegel, supra note 127, at
192–94 (arguing that the “practices of democractic constitutionalism enable mobilized
citizens to contest and shape popular beliefs about the Constitution’s original meaning
and so confer upon courts the authority to enforce the nation’s foundational commitments in new ways”).
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most visible internal conflict is over the degree to which the Constitution licenses courts to override majoritarian decision-making. An increasingly strident band of libertarian originalists argues for an expansive, liberty-preserving originalism under which judges must
“engage” rather than “abdicate.” More traditionalist conservatives
252
An
view this as a call for outright activism in a libertarian guise.
icon of the conservative judiciary, Judge Harvie Wilkinson, observed
that originalism allows the judge to enact his own policy preferences
253
no less than other interpretive models.
Likewise, Nelson Lund, a
well-known conservative scholar, wrote that “[t]he challenge for
originalist theory . . . is to distinguish genuinely originalist interpretations from those that amount to living constitutionalism or judicial
254
deferentialism dressed up in originalist clothing.”
Professor Lund
calls for a “conscientious originalism,” but his description of it is perfectly orthodox Low Originalism: “When the text does not supply an
adequately precise answer, a conscientiously originalist court has no
choice but to decide the issue in light of the purpose of the provision
255
as that purpose was understood by those who adopted it.”
Jamal Greene, a critical observer of originalism, seems to agree
with this Comment’s diagnosis of High Originalism’s flagging
256
strength. Greene reinforces Alicea and Drakeman’s argument that
intentionalism has been a part of American judicial practice since the
very beginning, but he bolsters the case by showing that it has never
257
really left the courts. As here, Greene distinguishes “intentionalists”
from “expectations originalist[s]” and acquits the Low Originalists of
258
that recalcitrant charge. Though Greene’s authority-based justification for considering speaker’s meaning is not identical to their mod259
els, he explicitly and repeatedly agrees with Low Originalists. Pro252

253

254
255
256
257
258
259

This debate is becoming quite prominent. E.g., Randy Barnett and Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, Sixth Annual Rosenkranz Debate Resolved: Courts are Too Deferential to the
Legislature (Nov. 14–16, 2013), available at http://youtube.com/watch?v=evp84_XcSwY.
See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 33 (2012) (“Originalism, with its
myriad virtues, has an important role to play in constitutional adjudication, but it suffers
from that all-too-common infirmity of cosmic constitutional theory: a lack of judicial restraint.”).
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1343, 1372 (2009).
Id. (emphasis added).
Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2012)
(“[O]riginal intent not only matters but it matters more than original meaning.”).
Id. at 1689–1701 (discussing “the practice relevance of original intent”).
Id. at 1702.
He agrees with Kay specifically, with whose position Greene affiliates Alexander, Prakash,
and Whittington. Id.
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fessor Greene argues that “the time has come to bring intentionalists
260
His proposal has Low
back into the constitutional mainstream.”
Originalists marching under the banner of intentionalism. But as we
have seen, that term creates confusion about whose intent is sought
and what role it plays, an involution that led to the earliest criticisms
261
of originalism and thereby contributed to the rise of High Originalism.
An early warning sounds when Alicea and Drakeman adopt Peter
Smith’s categories of “Old Originalism, New Originalism, and New
262
New Originalism[.]” Is the original New Originalism now the Old
New Originalism? One gets the impression that if originalism continues to evolve for much longer, it will adopt version numbers like
software updates. Originalism’s critics have at times reveled in its
pluralism, seizing on the diversity of thought as a hypocritical flaw;
piling adjective upon adjective can only strengthen the critics’
263
claims. It is past time to abandon chronological labels. If it is helpful to organize the many varieties of originalism—syntactic textualism,
original-methods originalism, semantic originalism—according to
some fundamental attribute, let it be whether the text is written by
real human hands, spoken by real human voices.
The label “Low Originalism” will itself comprise many diverse
strains of originalist theory. It certainly will not end the misunderstandings of originalism’s history or current taxonomy. But it will
avoid significant liminal perplexity and clean things up as the theory
moves forward. Of course, Low Originalism itself is not invulnerable.
Looking to the authors and enactors requires dealing with Old
Originalism’s foes, and any such account will have to explain why the
move to High Originalism was ill-begat. These High Originalists marshal many formidable arguments, none of which this Comment has
treated in any depth. Like the Constitution, Low Originalism is a
human affair fraught with human weaknesses. But it has the advantage of admitting that fact and living with it.

260
261
262
263

.

Id. at 1687.
See supra Part II.B.
Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 248, at 1164 (citing Peter J. Smith, How Different Are
Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707–08, 725 (2011)).
See Colby & Smith, supra note 129, at 305 (noting that originalism’s differences “undermine the rhetorical and normative claims that underlie much of the originalist enterprise”).
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CONCLUSION
Part II of this Comment told a story of originalism in order to
place the interpretive enterprise in context. It noted that the shift
from intent to public meaning, while real, was not nearly so clear or
decisive as is sometimes presented. Thus, Old Originalists were neither intentionalists nor original-public-meaning originalists. Part II
then separated New Originalism in to the High Originalists and the
Low Originalists. The conceptual analysis of the New Originalism attempted to show that High Originalism, while dominant, is neither
alone nor necessarily the most compelling model, and that its hegemony is beginning to crumble.
Originalism is besieged by claims of hypocrisy and inconsistency,
by the charge that it has abandoned any pretense to judicial restraint.
This Comment suggests that this is a phenomenon of High Originalism. The solution lies in speaker’s meaning, or intent, or whatever
name you want to give it. I call it Low Originalism, indicating its embrace of the humanness of our messy political lives. Abstractedprinciples originalism—High Originalism—is too divorced from reality
to do any good to constitutional communities. The call for a common sense understanding of meaning drawn from and accessible to
citizens—We the People—is an urgent one that resonates with the
words of Thomas Jefferson at the beginning of this Comment.
If this Comment accomplishes nothing else, I hope that it unscrambles the facile paradigm that identifies “Old” with “original intent seekers” and “New” with “public meaning seekers.” The New
Originalism was not a triumph of the High Originalists over their unsophisticated Old Originalist opponents. Rather, when the High
Originalists came onto the stage, they inaugurated the era of New
Originalism wherein they were ascendant for a time. Originalists today are still synthesizing (and sometimes syncretizing) their creed.
In conclusion, I suggest that Low Originalism is the road plied by
two of New Originalism’s greatest figures: Keith Whittington and Justice Antonin Scalia. Whittington’s originalism is quite thorough and
he explicates it largely in objectivist terms. While he demands some
level of publicity, he also insists that the communities who promul264
gated the text are not irrelevant. Justice Scalia’s judicial practice is
265
the subject of much Sturm und Drang, but in light of the discussion
herein, it is easy to see how the dust-up over original expectations fits
264
265

WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 246, at 35–36.
See, e.g., Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1282–83 (2007)
(outlining critiques of Justice Scalia’s arguments).
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a model of Low Originalism without falling prey to Dworkin’s caricature. It remains to another article—and to the reader in the interim—
to examine originalist writers through the lens proposed herein.
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